Bemerkenswert ist, dass das ATSB bereits ab dem 17. März die Suche im SIO koordinierte. Allerdings steht in der Presse auch viel Ungenaues.venerdi schrieb: Das australische Nachrichtenportal Perth Now schreibt, die Bilder «wurden Ende März 2014 von Regierungen und Behörden verworfen – bevor die ATSB in die Suche mit einbezogen wurde».
Original anzeigen (0,1 MB)
Original anzeigen (0,1 MB)ich kann mir schwer vorstellen, dass das Attentat auf Raza mit MH370 in Verbindung steht.citybird schrieb:1. Mord an malaysischem Diplomat Zahid Raza auf Madagaskar (bestätigt) - um die Weitergabe von MH370-Trümmern zu verhindern (VT)?
Update on Aug 29, 2017. The fasteners on the larger of the two pieces have been identified to be aviation related. Thank you to Annette Mansfield and Mike Exner for that information.auf http://mh370.radiantphysics.com/2017/08/28/new-pieces-possibly-from-mh370-blaine-gibson-threatened-in-madagascar/ (Archiv-Version vom 02.09.2017)
Its last position was positively fixed at the northern tip of Sumatra by the surveillance systems operating that night, six hours before it ended the flight in the southern Indian Ocean.Das klingt schon mal etwas merkwürdig, die letzte Sichtung (von Malaysia) war ja gar nicht an der Nordspitze von Sumatra. Doch noch eine andere Quelle?
Meinen die damit nicht die letzte Sichtung allgemein?
The ATSB has received and processed over 3,500 pieces of correspondence, which include theories and queries from members of the public, scientists and academics, questions and requests for interviews and access from local and international press.S. 6
The aircraft was fitted with a transponder that permitted ground-based secondary surveillanceneue Wegpunkte:
radars (SSR) to track it. A subsequent review of recorded ATC radar data revealed that the
aircraft passed waypoint IGARI at 1720:31 and that the Mode S transponder symbol of the aircraft
was not detected on Malaysian ATC radar after 1720:36. A matching SSR target captured by
Vietnamese radar at Conson Island was no longer detected after 1720:3311.
The aircraft passed over or near IFR waypoints ABTOK, KADAX and GOLUD (which are within 3Erstmalige offizielle Bestätigung des Telefonkontakts:
NM of each other) and later PUKAR.
mobile telephone registered to theMit Anm. 12:
aircraft’s first officer was detected by a mobile telecommunications tower at Bandar Baru Farlim
Penang at 1752:27, when the aircraft was south of Penang. There was no record of
communications having been made or attempted using this telephone.12
This information was obtained by the Royal Malaysian Police and reported to the Ministry of Transport Malaysia.(Hishammuddin hat das dementiert, obwohl er Verkehrsminister war)
Though a formal report was not available to the ATSB, information relevant to the search was shared.
Radar data shows the aircraft then headed to the northwest, eventually aligning with published airIn Anm. 11 dezenter Hinweis auf die Dauer bis zur Distress Phase:
route N571 from IFR waypoint VAMPI. The validity of this section of the radar data was verified
using the track of a commercial flight that followed N571 about 33 NM behind MH370.
From 1739:03 onwards, Malaysian and Vietnamese controllers attempted to contact the aircraft by radio withoutS. 10
success. A distress phase was formally initiated by Malaysian ATC at 2232:00.
Certificate of registration: M.1124 issued 23 August 2006S. 13
Replacement of Certificate issued 17 June 2002
The aircraftDas ist wieder so eine Nullaussage, vielleicht gibt es ja Detektionen eines unbekannten Flugobjekts (oder nur keine Berichte darüber).
continued to the northwest until a final radar position for the aircraft was recorded approximately
10 NM beyond IFR waypoint MEKAR at 1822:12 (Figure 3). There were no reports of the aircraft
being detected by any radar after this time.
There were also possible debris detections from 20 to 23 March 2014, by French satellites at aS. 25
location 80 to 150 km west of the 7th arc (these are discussed further in the Satellite imagery
analysis section).
On 28 March 2014 a search of the drifted S3/S4 overlap area (Area A) was commenced. More
than 50 objects were sighted and reported on that day (Table 14). Examination of images and
recovery of items by surface vessels did not identify any items considered associated with MH370.
In contrast, the northward move of the search on 28 March resulted in a high probability of detecting debris if the impact hadS. 27
been somewhere between about latitudes 26°S and 32.5°S. This phase of the surface search was
therefore of high value to the underwater search because it adds to the weight of evidence
suggesting that searching the seafloor north of about 32.5°S is unlikely to be successful.
MH370 PIC Microsoft flight simulator data analysis provided to AMSA/ ATSB byS. 30
Australian Federal Police (19 April 2014).
Five data points were recovered from the PIC’s home flight simulator (19 April 2014) (See PilotS. 31
in Command’s flight simulator section).
A review of the Ocean Shield acoustic detections was undertaken independently by various
specialists including the ULB manufacturer, DST Group, Air Accidents Investigation Branch
(United Kingdom), NTSB, Curtin University and Australian Joint Acoustic Analysis Centre. The
analyses determined that the signals recorded were not consistent with the nominal performance
of a Dukane DK100 ULB. Some analysts noted that the acoustic signals detected may be
consistent with a damaged ULB however the calculated offsets (by the manufacturer) to the
frequency, pulse width, and pulse repetition rate, for a damaged ULB, did not fully match any of
the recorded detections.
It was noted that if damage had occurred to both ULBs it would be highly unlikely that the resulting
offset frequency would be the same for each.
After the TPL equipment had been demobilised from Ocean Shield, Phoenix InternationalS. 40
performed a full test on TPL system 03S to identify and/or eliminate any possible sources for the
acoustic detections during the search for MH370’s ULBs. One of the tests performed showed that
a simulated faulty ‘self-test’ cable, with a high resistance short circuit, would activate the test ULB
mounted on the TPL. The faulty ‘self-test’ cable also caused the output frequency from the test
ULB to shift from 37.5 kHz to 33 kHz, caused broadband noise and altered the acoustic ping
repetition rate. The resulting acoustic signal is similar to the detections on board Ocean Shield
during the search for MH370’s ULBs.
1912 NW point (8⁰ 35.719’N, 92⁰35.145’E) reassessed as invalid and no longer used byS. 44
flight path reconstruction groups.
Im Abschlussbericht zeigen die Ermittler genau auf, was der Pilot auf dem Simulator übte. «Sechs Wochen vor dem Zwischenfall hatte der Kapitän seinen Simulator genutzt, um eine Route zu fliegen, die der Route von MH370 ähnlich war», heißt es. Sie habe entlang der Straße von Malacca und dann links in Richtung des südlichen Indischen Ozeans geführt.Das habe ich auch so im Bericht gelesen (zeimlich viel Text, habe bis jetzt einiges nur überflogen), allerdings bezog sich das nur auf das Gebiet sehr weit nördlich, als da wo man die falschen Blackbox-Signale gehört hat.
Das habe den Ermittlern auch Anlass gegeben, das Suchgebiet im Meer so festzulegen, wie sie es schlussendlich taten.
However, it was considered that the SDU reboot could beWird allerdings im weiteren widerlegt: das Flap schließt kontrollierte Wasserung (oder Versuch) aus, und die beiden letzten BFOs schließen den Gleitflug aus.
explained in other ways, much less likely, if there was someone active in the cockpit and
preparing the aircraft for a controlled ditching.
