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Der nächste Krieg der USA wird gegen den Iran sein
06.11.2011 um 13:03@Individualist
Was das Bedrohen von Israel angeht würde ich mal zwei Seiten zurückgehen und was Irans Atomprogramm betrifft, vielleicht mal die Berichte der IAEA lesen.
Individualist schrieb:Iran baut weder an einer Atomrakete noch bedrohen sie Israel. Die USA möchte nur Stimmung gegen den Iran verbreiten um den Saudis zu gefallen.Ja und es scheint immer die Sonne und Regen gibt es nicht.^^
Was das Bedrohen von Israel angeht würde ich mal zwei Seiten zurückgehen und was Irans Atomprogramm betrifft, vielleicht mal die Berichte der IAEA lesen.
G. Possible Military Dimensionshttp://iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2011/gov2011-29.pdf
33. The Board of Governors has called on Iran on a number of occasions to engage with the Agency on the resolution of all outstanding issues concerning Iran’s nuclear programme in order to exclude the existence of possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.37 In resolution 1929 (2010), the Security Council reaffirmed Iran’s obligations to take the steps required by the Board of Governors in its resolutions GOV/2006/14 and GOV/2009/82, including by providing access without delay to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested by the Agency.38
34. Previous reports by the Director General have listed the outstanding issues related to possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme and the actions required of Iran necessary to resolve these.39 On 6 May 2011, in light of Iran not having engaged with the Agency on the substance of these issues since August 2008, the Director General sent a letter to H.E. Mr Fereydoun Abbasi, Vice President of Iran and Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), reiterating the Agency’s concerns about the existence of possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme and expressing the importance of Iran clarifying these issues. In the same letter, the Director General also requested that Iran provide prompt access to relevant locations, equipment, documentation and persons, and noted that, with Iran’s substantive and
proactive engagement, the Agency would be able to make progress in its verification of the correctness and completeness of Iran’s declarations.
35. Based on the Agency’s continued study of information which the Agency has acquired from many Member States and through its own efforts, the Agency remains concerned about the possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed nuclear related activities involving military related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile. Since the last report of the Director General on 25 February 2011, the Agency has received further information related to such possible undisclosed nuclear related activities, which is currently being assessed by the Agency. As previously reported by the Director General, there are indications that certain of these activities may have continued beyond 2004.40 The following points refer to examples of activities for which clarifications remain necessary in seven particular areas of concern:
• Neutron generator and associated diagnostics: experiments involving the explosive compression of uranium deuteride to produce a short burst of neutrons.
• Uranium conversion and metallurgy: producing uranium metal from fluoride compounds and its
manufacture into components relevant to a nuclear device.
• High explosives manufacture and testing: developing, manufacturing and testing of explosive
components suitable for the initiation of high explosives in a converging spherical geometry.
• Exploding bridgewire (EBW) detonator studies, particularly involving applications necessitating
high simultaneity: possible nuclear significance of the use of EBW detonators.
• Multipoint explosive initiation and hemispherical detonation studies involving highly instrumented
experiments: integrating EBW detonators in the development of a system to initiate hemispherical
high explosive charges and conducting full scale experiments, work which may have benefitted from
the assistance of foreign expertise.
• High voltage firing equipment and instrumentation for explosives testing over long distances and
possibly underground: conducting tests to confirm that high voltage firing equipment is suitable for
the reliable firing of EBW detonators over long distances.
• Missile re-entry vehicle redesign activities for a new payload assessed as being nuclear in nature:
conducting design work and modelling studies involving the removal of the conventional high
explosive payload from the warhead of the Shahab-3 missile and replacing it with a spherical nuclear payload.