kurvenkrieger schrieb:Könntest Du das näher erläutern und noch mit Quellen anreichern? Igendwo wirste das ja aufgeschnappt haben.
The Grand Chessboard.
this regard, Ukraine was critical. The growing American inclination, especially by 1994, to assign a high priority to AmericanUkrainian relations and to help Ukraine sustain its new national freedom was viewed by many in Moscow—even by its "westernizers"—as a policy directed at the vital Russian interest in eventually bringing Ukraine back into the common fold.
That Ukraine will eventually somehow be "reintegrated" remains an article of faith among many members of the Russian political elite.5
As a result, Russia's geopolitical and historical questioning of Ukraine's separate status collided head-on with the American view that an imperial Russia could not be a democratic Russia.
Russia, it hardly needs saying, remains a major geostrategic player, in spite of its weakened state and probably prolonged malaise. Its very presence impacts massively on the newly independent states within the vast Eurasian space of the former Soviet Union. It entertains ambitious geopolitical objectives, which it increasingly proclaims openly. Once it has recovered its strength, it will also impact significantly on its western and eastern neighbors. Moreover, Russia has still to make its fundamental geostrategic choice regarding its relationship with America: is it a friend or foe? It may well feel that it has major options on the Eurasian continent in that regard. Much depends on how its internal politics evolve and especially on whether Russia becomes a European democracy or a Eurasian empire again. In any case, it clearly remains a player, even though it has lost some of its "pieces," as well as some key spaces on the Eurasian chessboard.
