Ich bin noch immer nicht davon überzeugt, dass China wirklich nichts weiss. Ich bin dabei heute auf einen Artikel gestossen, den ich anderer Stelle schon gepostet habe, in welchem ein indischer Admiral im Ruhestand aus den Gegebenheiten in der Nacht in der südchinesischen See und der offiziellen Stille aus China schliesst, dass Chinas behauptete Überwachungskapazität übertrieben ist.
Nicht erwähnt wird ein m.E. anderer Schluss: dass China durchaus mitbekommen hat, zumindest teilweise, was mit MH 370 geschah.
Man mache sich selbst ein Bild. Der Autor ist im Ruhestand und war bis 2009 Kommandeur des strategischen Kommandos der indischen Marine, Kommandeur der Westflotte, und Kommandeur der Marine in der Andamansee.
Er spricht das chinesische Luftraumkontrollzentrum Sanya (Hainan) an und wie es, laut China, in das Luftverteidigungssystem eingebaut ist. Dabei fällt auf, dass Hainan eine sehr hohe strategische Bedeutung für China hat, hier ist nämlich der Stützpunkt seiner atomar bewaffneten U-Boote. Für den Autor ist klar: so ein Ort müsste besonders gut bewacht sein.
Hier Auszüge des Artikels mit Hervorhebungen von mir, link weiter unten:
Leaving aside the initial bungling by Malaysian aviation authorities; conspiracy theories abound, from a terrorist attack to a suicidal cockpit to a US sponsored clandestine seizure and strike to prevent high security cargo from falling into Chinese hands. However, more significant to our narrative is the response of China’s most recent Flight Information Region (FIR) Centre at Sanya and its integration into that nation’s Air Defence network. The Sanya FIR (in Hainan) is responsible for managing traffic and maintaining continuous surveillance over the South China Sea. Its formal area of responsibility is a sea space of 280,000 square kilometres which approximates a square of 530 kms sides or a circle of diameter 600 kms extending into the South China Sea. While China’s claim to sovereignty over the entire South China Sea does not include the Gulf of Thailand; the last reported position of MH 370 was within 500 kms of its claimed territorial sea and about 1200 kms from Hainan. Also, had the flight stuck to its planned route, it would have over flown Vietnam and entered Chinese “airspace” in the Sanya FIR by 0215 hrs; it did not and therefore the question arises why was Sanya Air Control Centre at such a run down state of alert and the Chinese Air Defense organisation wanting in alacrity or in a heightened state of readiness? Given the current imbroglio in the South China Sea, the state of air surveillance it may be assumed, would have demanded early tracking and far more credible situational awareness. And a consideration that cannot be lost sight of is the fact that Hainan is home to the Chinese South Sea Naval Fleet at Beihai and houses its strategic ballistic missile submarine force at Yulin; which must play some part in assuring domain wakefulness.
Weiterhin spricht er an, dass China selbst behauptet, Sanya ist in das Verteidigungssystem A2AD eingebunden, das behauptet, selbst einen feindlichen Flugzeugträger in 2000 km Entfernung aufspüren und vernichten zu können. Und - so schliesst er richtig- um einen solchen Träger zu erkennen, ist der erste Schritt, Luftverkehr der von ihm ausgeht, zu erkennen. Wenn das System das kann - warum kann es dann angeblich MH 370 nicht sehen?
To the astute military analyst the 370 incident places the edifice of China’s Anti Access Area Denial (A2AD) Strategy, upon which is predicated the emergence of the People’s Liberation Army as a major player in the Asia Pacific region, as some what less than persuasive. The strategy is based on the marriage of the Dong-Feng 21D anti surface ballistic missile as the “aircraft carrier killer” with matching surveillance capability that could detect and target hostile aircraft carriers at ranges in excess of 2000 kilometres.Critically the kill chain begins with detection of the Carrier’s flight operations. The entire episode must also have come as a dampener to the heady mixture of Chinese nationalism, its new found wealth and its urge to upset the status-quo that animates what may be called the ‘China Arrival’.
If China touts the A2AD strategy as its existential future, it is clear that the credibility of such a scheme has taken a hammering. In defence, China’s planners may argue that they had not brought to bear the full weight of their military surveillance capability for security reasons; but this contention does not hold very much water for two reasons; firstly by 09 March Chinese remote sensing satellites had been deployed with considerable operational alacrity (if not precision) to join the search effort and secondly the A2AD strategy is, to all intents and purpose, a deterrent strategy and under the circumstance conditions were ideal to demonstrate its surveillance competence. In the event its satellite reported possible debris of the ill-fated aircraft within 90 kms south of Vietnam’s Tho Chu Island about 150 kms north of the last known position reported at 0130 hrs on 08 March. The search centre moved to this new position; however the deployed scouts drew a blank. The fresh datum for the search served to dilute international exertions which only regrouped after an analysis of satellite communications doppler shift to concentrate efforts 9 days later in the south Indian Ocean about 6000 kms. southwest of the of the first report.
http://thestrategicdialogues.com/tag/sanya-air-control-center/Zum Autor:
http://thestrategicdialogues.com/about/Wie gesagt, er meint China behauptet mehr zu können als es wirklich tut, aber stimmt das? Oder schweigt China aus anderen Gründen?
bennamucki schrieb:Also ich denke, daß das Rätsel hier nicht zu lösen ist.
