Fedaykin schrieb:Tatsache ist Kennedy ist schlicht überbewertet
^^Er war kein Heiliger- nur wird häufig seine außenpolitk der letzten Monate ignoriert und er folglich unterbewertet
Fedaykin schrieb:Ach Kennedy hat überhaupt erst die Sache in Vietnam richtig begonnen.
Nicht wirklich:
Harry Truman initiated the US involvement. From 1950 to 1953, he gave financial aid to the French colonialists as they struggled to re-establish control of Indochina in the face of opposition from Vietnamese Communists and nationalists. It could be argued that, up to 1953, the United States' commitment was simply a financial commitment to its French ally. On the other hand, as early as November 1950, a Defence Department official warned,
we are gradually increasing our stake in the outcome of the struggle ... we are dangerously close to the point of being so deeply committed that we may find ourselves completely committed even to direct intervention. These situations, unfortunately, have a way of snowballing.
In the early months of his presidency, Eisenhower continued Truman's policy of helping the French, but after the Geneva Conference of 1954, the great turning point in the US commitment occurred. Prior to 1954, US involvement in Vietnam had consisted of giving materials and monetary aid to the French. During 1954 the Eisenhower administration switched from a policy of aid to France to an experiment in state-building in what became known as South Vietnam.
...
The French exit meant that Eisenhower could have dropped Truman's commitment in Vietnam. Truman had aided the French, and the French had got out. American credibility was not at stake, for it was the French who had lost the struggle. However, the French withdrawal from Vietnam was seen by Dulles as a great opportunity for greater US involvement. ‘We have a clean base there now, without the faint taint of colonialism,’ said Dulles, calling Dienbienphu ‘a blessing in disguise’. When the Eisenhower administration created South Vietnam, Truman's commitment had not been renewed but recreated, with a far greater degree of American responsibility.
American observers and the Eisenhower administration had great doubts about Diem's regime. Vice President Richard Nixon was convinced the South Vietnamese lacked the ability to govern themselves. Even Dulles admitted that the US supported Diem ‘because we knew of no one better’.
...
In defence of Kennedy, the US had invested nearly a decade of monetary aid, men and materials in the Saigon regime by 1963. Most importantly of all, the US had invested its credibility in ‘nation building’ – something that had not been the case under Truman or until Eisenhower rejected the Geneva Accords in 1954. According to historian David Anderson, writing in 2005, ‘the Eisenhower administration trapped itself and its successors into a commitment to the survival of its own counterfeit creation’, the new ‘state’ of South Vietnam.
Thus Eisenhower's rejection of the Geneva Accords and his ‘nation building’ in South Vietnam constituted the greatest turning point in the US involvement in Vietnam, the point of no return. This turning point is a microcosm of the reasons why the US got involved and why the US was unsuccessful in Vietnam. That small country was not seen as a nation in its own right and with its own aspirations. Instead it was seen, after the Korean War, as the place where Communism had to be stopped. Vietnam was a victim of the Cold War. American policy-makers acted with little understanding of the country and forced unpopular and unimpressive rulers upon half of it for nearly two decades.
http://www.historytoday.com/viv-sanders/turning-points-vietnam-warEisenhower hat die USA nach Vietnam gebracht.
Es gab schon in Kennedys erstem Amtsjahr Forderungen nach dem Einsatz von Bodentruppen, d.h. einer direkten militärischen Intervention- nicht nur von Seiten der Generäle, sondern auch von McNamara und anderen Kabinettsmitgliedern und Beratern. JFK war meistens der Einzige, der diese Empfehlungen und Forderungen zurückwies. Da seit 1992 viele akten zu JFKs Vientnampolitk freigegeben wurden, lässt sich das belegen.
What follows is one of the highlights of the book.
Goldstein enumerates the number of times Kennedy turned down requests to commit combat troops to save the day before the White House debate over the Taylor/Rostow mission in November of 1961. He starts out with the request of Gen. Ed Lansdale in January of 1961. (p. 52) In April of 1961, McNamara suggested the same. (p. 53)
That same month, Kennedy rejected a backdoor: he refused combat troops as trainers. (p. 54) He was asked twice in May and turned down both requests. (ibid) By July he had turned down a total of six requests. (p. 55)
On July 15th, Max Taylor and Walt Rostow again requested combat troops. Bundy kept notes on this colloquy which Goldstein prints here. He wrote, "Questions from the president showed that the detailed aspects of this military plan had not been developed ... the president made clear his own deep concern with the need for realism and accuracy in ... military planning. He had observed in earlier military plans with respect to Laos that optimistic estimates were invariably proven false in the event ... He emphasized the reluctance of the American people and of many distinguished leaders to see any direct involvement of US troops in that part of the world." Rostow and Taylor tried to argue back but Kennedy said, "Gen. DeGaulle, out of painful French experience, had spoken with feeling of the difficulty of fighting in this part of the world."
Vice-President Johnson then called for a firmer military commitment to the region, including Laos. Kennedy resisted by saying, "Nothing would be worse than an unsuccessful intervention in the area, and that he did not have confidence in the military practicability of the proposal which had been put before him." (pgs 56-57) This now made seven rejections of American direct intervention in seven months.
On October 11th, Deputy Defense Secretary Alexis Johnson joined the push for combat troops. Again, Kennedy did not agree. But he did authorize a mission to South Vietnam by Max Taylor and Walt Rostow. (p. 57) At this time, the hawks in the White House begin to leak stories that Kennedy would now probably commit troops to Vietnam. When Kennedy saw the stories, he himself leaked a story denying it. (ibid)
On October 20th, Frederick Nolting, the American ambassador in Vietnam, requested combat troops for flood relief purposes. Taylor was on the scene, and he agreed with the request—if he did not put Nolting up to it. Kennedy consulted with an agricultural expert and turned it down. Taylor then talked to the press about the issue. Kennedy telegrammed Taylor to stop doing so. (p. 58)
When Kennedy received the Taylor/Rostow report, it again requested the sending of combat troops to Vietnam. And it couched the request in dire terms. It said if such a commitment was not made, the fall of South Vietnam would likely follow. (p. 60) The formal White House debate over the recommendation was taken up on November 7th. In addition to Taylor and Rostow, Defense Secretary McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Bundy, and the entire Joint Chiefs of Staff told Kennedy to send combat troops. On November 15th, Kennedy closed the debate. At this point, Goldstein makes two cogent observations. There were only two people in the entire White House who sided with Kennedy on this issue. They were George Ball and John Kenneth Galbraith.
When Ball personally approached Kennedy since he thought he might be weakening and could give in, Kennedy replied to him: "George, you're just crazier than hell. That just isn't going to happen." (p. 62) And after this debate, Kennedy told Galbraith he was going to send him to Saigon. He wanted him to render a report also. (p. 61) Knowing what it would say, he would only give it to McNamara. And McNamara would now become Kennedy's point man on his withdrawal plan. The third result of this debate was Kennedy's issuance of National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 111, which increased the number of advisers to above 15,000, with no provision for combat troops.
When Bundy reviewed all the above with Goldstein, he was impressed with both Kennedy's insight and his steadfastness. He also told Professor James Blight, one of the co-editors of the fine book Virtual JFK, that
Kennedy simply did not think that combat troops would work in South Vietnam. Because he did not see the struggle as a conventional war but as a classic counter-insurgency conflict. Bundy and Goldstein came to the conclusion that much of this was instilled in Kennedy from his visit to Vietnam in the early fifties during the last throes of the French imperial war there. (p. 235)
Another strong influence was his discussion of the issue with Douglas MacArthur. The general told Kennedy it would be foolish to fight a large land war in Southeast Asia. He told him that he could pour a million men into the struggle and still be outnumbered. (p. 235) Alexis Johnson was skeptical of MacArthur's stance but he admitted that it made a profound effect on President Kennedy. Max Taylor agreed with him. He said MacArthur's analysis made a "hell of an impression on the President." (ibid) Kennedy later told Bundy's assistant Michael Forrestal "that the odds against an American victory over the Viet Cong were 100 to 1." (p. 239) Since, as Bundy said, Kennedy did not buy into the Domino Theory, those odds were simply not worth it.
Consequently, Bundy saw these ten rejections in eleven months as Kennedy's final decision on the issue. And Bundy described a following meeting in January of 1962 in Palm Beach, Florida where Kennedy emphasized the advice and support role to be played by the Americans. (p. 71) That was a line Kennedy was not going to cross. And he didn't.
http://www.ctka.net/reviews/virtual_jfk_3.htmlWar Kennedys Weigerung 1961 keine Bodentruppen nach Vietnam zu schicken eine schlechte entscheidung?
War LBJs Forderung nach direkter militärischer intervention 1961 zu befürworten?
Interessant ist, was Kennedy im Gegensatz zu Johnson schon 1961 Begriff, nämlich, dass eine direkte Intervention der USA in Vietnam nicht zu gewinnen wäre.
Für Laos, Vietnams nachbarland, hatte Kennedy schon 1961 eine diplomatische Lösung gefunden.
Kennedy moved cautiously. He rejected a variety of proposals to send American forces and concluded that a negotiated settlement with the Soviet Union and other interested parties was the best he could achieve. A 1962 peace conference in Geneva produced a Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos and a three-part coalition government divided between pro-American, pro-Communist and neutral factions. From Washington's standpoint, the arrangement was flimsy, but it was the best of unattractive options.
http://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/JFK-in-History/Laos.aspxWar es eine schlechte Entscheidung 1961, eine diplomatische Lösung für Laos zu suchen? Oder wäre es besser gewesen, militärisch zu intervenieren?
War JFKs Versuch, über Kenneth Galbraith eine ähnliche lösung für Vietnam zu suchen, gut oder schlecht?
WASHINGTON --
Newly uncovered documents from both American and Polish archives show that President John F. Kennedy and the Soviet Union secretly sought ways to find a diplomatic settlement to the war in Vietnam, starting three years before the United States sent combat troops.Kennedy, relying on his ambassador to India, John Kenneth Galbraith, planned to reach out to the North Vietnamese in April 1962 through a senior Indian diplomat, according to a secret State Department cable that was never dispatched.
Back-channel discussions also were attempted in January 1963, this time through the Polish government, which relayed the overture to Soviet leaders. New Polish records indicate Moscow was much more open than previously thought to using its influence with North Vietnam to cool a Cold War flash point.The attempts to use India and Poland as go-betweens ultimately fizzled,
partly because of North Vietnamese resistance and partly because Kennedy faced pressure from advisers to expand American military involvement, according to the documents and interviews with scholars. Both India and Poland were members of the International Control Commission that monitored the 1954 agreement that divided North and South Vietnam
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2005/06/06/papers_reveal_jfk_efforts_on_vietnam/?page=full (Archiv-Version vom 20.10.2012)LBJ war immer gegen eine Lösung, die Vietnam wie Laos zu einem neutralen Land im Kalten Krieg machen würde.
But thanks also in part to recently declassified records, we now know that Kennedy's top aides--whatever his own views--were offering him counsel not all that different from what Bush was told forty years later. Early that November, his personal military adviser, Gen. Maxwell Taylor, and his deputy National Security Adviser, Walt Rostow, were on their way back from Saigon with a draft of the "Taylor report," their bold plan to "save" Vietnam, beginning with the commitment of at least 8,000 US troops--a down payment, they hoped, on thousands more to follow. But they knew JFK had no interest in their idea because six months earlier in a top-secret meeting, he had forcefully vetoed his aides' proposed dispatch of 60,000 troops to neighboring Laos--and they were worried about how to maneuver his assent.
http://www.thenation.com/article/galbraith-and-vietnam (Archiv-Version vom 20.08.2015)Fedaykin schrieb:Kennedy hat sich nicht an die Sowjets angenährt, noch an Kuba.
Ach nein?
Kennedy Sought Dialogue with Cuba
INITIATIVE WITH CASTRO ABORTED BY ASSASSINATION,
DECLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS SHOW
Washington D.C. - On the 40th anniversary of the assassination of John F. Kennedy, and the eve of the broadcast of a new documentary film on Kennedy and Castro, the National Security Archive today posted an audio tape of the President and his national security advisor, McGeorge Bundy, discussing the possibility of a secret meeting in Havana with Castro. The tape, dated only seventeen days before Kennedy was shot in Dallas, records a briefing from Bundy on Castro's invitation to a U.S. official at the United Nations, William Attwood, to come to Havana for secret talks on improving relations with Washington. The tape captures President Kennedy's approval if official U.S. involvement could be plausibly denied.
The possibility of a meeting in Havana evolved from a shift in the President's thinking on the possibility of what declassified White House records called "an accommodation with Castro" in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Proposals from Bundy's office in the spring of 1963 called for pursuing "the sweet approach…enticing Castro over to us," as a potentially more successful policy than CIA covert efforts to overthrow his regime. Top Secret White House memos record Kennedy's position that "we should start thinking along more flexible lines" and that "the president, himself, is very interested in [the prospect for negotiations]." Castro, too, appeared interested. In a May 1963 ABC News special on Cuba, Castro told correspondent Lisa Howard that he considered a rapprochement with Washington "possible if the United States government wishes it. In that case," he said, "we would be agreed to seek and find a basis" for improved relations.
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB103/index.htmhttp://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/2012/10/05/the-forgotten-jfk-proposal-a-joint-u-s-soviet-moon-landing-video/http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/kennedy-proposes-joint-mission-to-the-moonWas sollte an der annäherung an Castro und die Sowjets "Notlösungen" gewesen sein? Inwiefern stellten JFKs versuche keine Ansätze zu einer Entspannung im Kalten Krieg dar?
Fedaykin schrieb:Es war wohl auch die Schwäche die er in Augen der UDSSR besaß das viele Kriesen wie Mauerbau, Kuba Krise und co erst für die ZK in den Fokus rückten.
Wenn er "stark" gewesen wäre, wäre es zur militärische Konfrontation gekommen, also dritter Weltkrieg- in Laos, Berlin oder Kuba
Einerseits bemängelst du seine "Schwäche", die zu den Krisen geführt hätte, andererseits JFKs Aufrüstung (also zeigen von Stärke)- wie passt das zusammen? Du bemängelst, dass JFK die USA angeblich nach Vietnam brachte, den "Veitnamkrieg begann", also Härte zeigte, aber gleichzeitig eine "Schwäche" gegenüber den Kommunisten- wie passt das zusammen?
War es e1963 ine gute oder schlechte Entscheidung JFkS, sich aus Vietnam zurückzuziehen?
Fedaykin schrieb:über sein Privatleben und co sparen wir uns mal aus, ebenso über die Mafiaverbindungen.
^^Nixon, LBJ und Fordhatten ebenfalls Mafiaverbindungen bzw. waren korrupt.
http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/JFKbakerB.htmhttp://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/kennedy-ford-affairs-east-german-spy-johnson-aide-article-1.1525033http://www.crimemagazine.com/mobs-president-richard-nixons-secret-ties-mafiaauch interessant:
n 22nd November, 1963, a friend of Baker's, Don B. Reynolds told B. Everett Jordan and his Senate Rules Committee that Johnson had demanded that he provided kickbacks in return for this business. This included a $585 Magnavox stereo. Reynolds also had to pay for $1,200 worth of advertising on KTBC, Johnson's television station in Austin. Reynolds had paperwork for this transaction including a delivery note that indicated the stereo had been sent to the home of Johnson.
Don B. Reynolds also told of seeing a suitcase full of money which Baker described as a "$100,000 payoff to Johnson for his role in securing the Fort Worth TFX contract". His testimony came to an end when news arrived that President John F. Kennedy had been assassinated.
As soon as Lyndon B. Johnson became president he contacted B. Everett Jordan to see if there was any chance of stopping this information being published. Jordan replied that he would do what he could but warned Johnson that some members of the committee wanted Reynold's testimony to be released to the public.
nanusia schrieb:Ganz spontan würd ich meinen, dass LBJ seine Finger mit drin hatte, er war regelrecht darauf versessen noch im Flugzeug als neuer Präsident vereidigt zu werden. Ohne Rücksicht auf Jackie, alle Anwesenden, auf JFK, der einen Raum weiter im Sarg lag.
LBJ war sich wahrscheinlich einer Verschwörung bewusst und half zumindest kräftig bei der Vertuschung mit- Beweismittel wie die Limousine, der Sarg etc. befanden sich ja unter Kontrolle des SS, der "Leibgarde" des Präsidenten LBJ. er hat auf jeden Fall vom Attentat profitiert.
Der Mann hier ganz links zwinkert LBJ zu.
Maverick119 schrieb:Weil in der Doku der Schussverlauf des Kopfschusses durch einen Ballistiker und Spezialisten herausgefunden wurde und dieser Schuss laut dem Ballistiker nicht von Oswald aus dem Schulbuchlager aus abgefeuert werden konnte.
